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Abstract
Both in Europe and in the United States, major steps have been taken to render credit
rating agencies more accountable. But do these steps address the causes of the debacle in
the subprime mortgage market that triggered the 2008-2009 crisis? Surveying the latest
evidence on how and why credit ratings became inflated, this paper argues that conflicts
of interest cannot be purged on a piecemeal basis. The fundamental choice is between
(1) implementing a “subscriber pays” model that compels rating agencies to compete for
the favor of investors, not issuers, and (2) seeking to deemphasize or eliminate the role
of credit ratings to reduce the licensing power of rating agencies. Although it strongly
favors the first option over the second, it also recognizes that the “public goods” nature of
ratings makes it unlikely that a “subscriber pays” system will develop on its own without
regulatory interventions. Thus, it considers how best to encourage the development of
a modified system under which the investor would choose and the issuer/deal arranger
would pay for the initial rating on structured finance transactions.
Keywords: credit rating, Dodd-Frank Act, public good, European Commission
JEL Classifications: G18, G28, G29, G38, K22
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Ratings Reform: A Policy Primer on Proposed, Pending and
Possible Credit Rating Reforms
by John C. Coffee, Jr. *
Broad consensus exists that inflated credit ratings and conflict-ridden rating
processes played a significant role in exacerbating the 2008 financial crisis.1 For a variety
of reasons – including the shared oligopoly that the major rating agencies enjoy, their
virtual immunity from liability, and the conflicts of interest surrounding their common
“issuer pays” business model – the major credit rating agencies (“CRAs”) simply had too
little incentive to “get it right.” Indeed, the margin by which they did not “get it right”
now seems extraordinary.2 By one estimate, 36% of all Collateralized Debt Obligations
(“CDOs”) that were based on U.S. asset-backed securities had defaulted by July 2008.3
Beyond the recognition that the CRAs failed and that their efforts and
performance were compromised by serious conflicts of interest, little consensus exists,
particularly among academics, on the shape of reform. Numerous reforms have been
proposed by numerous champions, but fundamental disagreements divide even the most
trenchant critics of the CRAs. Many view the CRAs as gatekeepers possessing
*

John C. Coffee, Jr. is the Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia University Law School
and Director of its Center on Corporate Governance.
1
Reflecting this consensus, the Group of Twenty (G20) announced in April, 2009 their agreement
on the need for “more effective oversight of the activities of Credit Rating Agencies.” See Global
Plan Annex: Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System Statement Issued by the G20
Leaders, April 2, 2009, London.
2
For the finding that the ratings on structured finance products were highly inaccurate, see Joshua
D. Coval, Jacob W. Jurek, and Erik Stafford, Economic Catastrophe Bonds, 99 Amer. Eco. Rev.
628 (2009); see also Joshua D. Coval, Jacob W. Jurek, and Erik Stafford, The Economics of
Structured Finance, 23 J. Econ. Persp. 3 (2009). For criticisms of the rating process and practices
such as ratings shopping, see Efraim Benmelech and Jennifer Dlugosz, The Alchemy of CDO
Credit Ratings, 56 J. of Monetary Economics 617 (2009).
3
See John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide” Credit Crisis: The Limits
of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform and A Proposal for Improvement, (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1267625) at 12.
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reputational capital that they pledge to generate investors confidence in their ratings.4
From this “reputational capital” perspective, conflicts of interest become the principal
problem, as the CRAs may willingly (even cynically) sacrifice some reputational capital
for enhanced revenues, at least so long as barriers to entry remain high and their legal
liability stays low. From a different perspective, however, the CRAs are viewed less as
informational intermediaries (or “gatekeepers”) and more as holders of regulatory
licenses that enabled them to exploit their quasi-governmental power for self-interested
purposes.5 Some even doubt that the market needs credit rating agencies, believing that
their role could and should be replaced by alternative mechanisms, including greater
reliance on credit spreads.
Thus, while those who start from the “gatekeeper” perspective tend to favor
reforms aimed at reducing conflicts of interest (either by increasing CRA liability or
restricting the issuer’s ability to choose the rating agency), those who take the “regulatory
license” perspective favor deregulation that ends the need for regulated financial
institutions to obtain investment grade ratings before investing. This tension was evident
in the drafting of the U.S.’s recent financial reform legislation – the Dodd-Frank Act –
which largely straddles this gap. But if the deregulatory approach is taken, it leads to a
further problem: How should financial institutions (such as money market funds) be
regulated once it is acknowledged that in competitive markets these firms may be under

4

For a statement of this view (and a recognition of its limits), see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
GATEKEEPERS: The Professions and Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press 2006).
5
The leading proponent of this view that ratings-dependent regulation should be dismantled is
Professor Frank Partnoy. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel & Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two
Thumbs Down for the Rating Agencies, 77 Wash. U. L. W. 619 (1999); see also Partnoy,
Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis, (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430653).
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pressure to take on excessive risk in order to obtain above-market returns? Can regulators
define “creditworthy” investments with sufficient precision to enable them to end their
current reliance on credit ratings?
The choice is fundamental. Although it is desirable to discourage unthinking
reliance by investors on credit ratings, the implications of any mandatory downsizing of
the role of the CRAs (beyond that which will naturally occur in a market dissatisfied with
their performance) are uncertain. For some industries (such as housing finance) that
depend upon asset-backed securitizations, access to capital may depend upon ratings that
are credible, because “do-it-yourself” financial analysis of opaque debt instruments is
simply not feasible for most financial institutions. Also, if the current reliance on
investment grade credit ratings were ended, the manner by which sensitive financial
institutions (most notably, money market funds) should be regulated remains unresolved.
Are they to be given carte blanche to invest in any form of debt security? If not, can state
and federal regulators define credit worthiness in comprehensible and comprehensive
terms? Deficient as the CRAs have been, it is not obvious that governmental agencies can
do much better, either at promulgating required standards of creditworthiness or in
providing their own credit ratings.
Agreement, does, however, exist on one score: all want increased competition
among CRAs. But, as will be seen, the impact of increased competition is problematic; it
can encourage ratings arbitrage, as issuers pressure competing rating agencies to relax
their standards. In any event, a feasible path to increased competition from the current
starting point of oligopoly is far from obvious. The barriers to entry into this field are
likely to remain forbiddingly high. Quite simply, the “Catch 22” for new entrants is that it
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is nearly impossible to obtain clients without a track record for reliable ratings and such a
track record is difficult to generate unless one first has clients. Thus, to generate
competition, some governmental intervention appears necessary. Possible such responses
include: (1) authorizing an independent body to select the rating agency; (2) mandating
(and thereby effectively subsidizing) a “subscriber pays” model for ratings; and (3)
creating a governmental rating agency to issue ratings (much like the TVA was created in
the United States as a check on the monopoly power of private utilities). Evaluating these
options and the defining the regulatory objectives of enhanced oversight will be a focus
of this paper.
After a brief review of the latest empirical evidence on the failure of the CRAs,
this paper will argue that the conflict inherent in the dominant “issuer pays” business
model and the concentrated character of the CRA market require an interlinked solution
that either (1) divorces issuer payment of the CRA from issuer selection of the CRA, or
(2) encourages (and implicitly subsidizes) an alternative “subscriber pays” market for
ratings.
Unlike more thorough-going critics of the CRAs, this article recognizes (as does a
recent study by the staff of the New York Federal Reserve Bank6) that the CRAs do
provide valuable information that strongly influences the cost of capital. At least in the
case of complex and opaque debt securities (such as collateralized debt obligations or
“CDOs”), “do-it-yourself” credit analysis, even by relatively sophisticated institutional
investors, is no more feasible than “do-it-yourself” brain surgery. Thus, reform of the
CRAs is to be preferred over free market solutions that permit anyone to issue credit
6

See Adam Ashcraft, Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham, and James Vickery, “MBS Ratings and the
Mortgage Credit Boom” (Staff Report No. 449, May, 2010).
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ratings and anyone to rely on them. That premise appears also to be shared by the U.S.
Congress, Canada, and the EU Commission, which have all recently introduced systems
for the mandatory registration and oversight of CRAs. Nonetheless, some downsizing of
the mandatory role of credit ratings may be part of a balanced policy approach.
Because this paper covers European as well as U.S. developments, it must be
underscored at the outset that context counts – particularly in two critical respects. First,
the institutional culture and regulatory options available in the U.S. and Europe differ.
The United States characteristically relies on private enforcement and civil litigation to
deter wrongdoing, and the recent U.S. legislation continues this tradition. These litigation
options are less relied upon in Europe, where the class action and contingent fee are not
generally recognized and where “white collar” criminal enforcement is less common.
Public enforcement and regulatory negotiation tend to be the favored levers in Europe.
Similarly, Europe has not accorded the credit rating agencies the same de facto regulatory
power as the United States has, with the result that downsizing their regulatory role may
be a less important objective in Europe.
Second, the failure of the CRAs was almost uniquely with respect to structured
financial products. Similar problems have not characterized the ratings of corporate
bonds. Arguably, the necessary reforms can be safely limited to the lucrative and opaque
context of structured finance. As next discussed, the conflicts were stronger and the
prospects for ratings arbitrage greater in the case of structured finance.
Part I: What Went Wrong?: A Summary of the
Criticisms and the Recent Evidence
Although the following criticisms overlap, each involves a different aspect of the
problem:
-6-

A. The CRAs Ignored Massive and Rapid Deterioration in the Creditworthiness
of Subprime Mortgages and Significantly Inflated Their Ratings After 2000.
The rapid deterioration in credit quality associated with subprime mortgages is
shown by the following table:7
Exhibit A
Low/No-Doc
Share

Debt
Payments/
Income

Loan/Value

ARM Share

Interest-Only
Share

2001

28.5%

39.7%

84.0%

73.8%

0.0%

2002

38.6%

40.1%

84.4%

80.0%

2.3%

2003

42.8%

40.5%

86.1%

80.1%

8.6%

2004

45.2%

41.2%

84.9%

89.4%

27.3%

2005

50.7%

41.8%

83.2%

93.3%

37.8%

2006

50.8%

42.4%

83.4%

91.3%

22.8%

As it shows, “low document” loans (or “liars’ loans” in the U.S. parlance) almost doubled
over a five year period and came to represent the majority of subprime loans. Moreover,
adjustable rate mortgages (or “teaser” loans with initially low interest rates that later

7

Jennifer E. Bethel, Allen Ferrell & Gang Hu, Law & Economic Issues in Subprime Litigation,
Harvard John Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business Discussion Paper No. 612 (March
2008). A more recent study by the staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York finds that the
percentage of “low/no-doc mortgages” in subprime mortgage securitizations rose from 24.8% in
2001 to 46% in 2006 and 45.1% in 2007. Similarly, the percentage of “interest-only” mortgages
in subprime mortgage deals rose from 0% in 2001 to 21% in 2006 (and then declined to 16.4% in
2007). Although these changes are slightly less stark, this same study found that on “Alt-A deals”
(which are slightly more creditworthy than subprime mortgages), “low/no-doc” loans rose from
66.3% in 2001 to 79.3% in 2007, and “interest-only” loans rose from 0.4% in 2001 to 62.3% in
2007 – an even more dramatic transition. See Adam Ashcraft, Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham, James
Vickery, “MBS Ratings and the Mortgage Credit Boom,” (FRBNY Staff Report No. 449, May
2010). Thus, from both sources, the same picture emerges of an extraordinary deterioration in
creditworthiness over a brief period.
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steeply climbed) grew to over 91% of all such loans. Interest-only loans (which imply
that the borrower could not afford to amortize the principal on the loan) rose to nearly
23% of such loans by 2006. But ratings did not change to reflect these trends.
In overview, the securitization process seems to have led to lax screening by loan
originators. One study finds that the highest rates of default occurred on loans sold by the
loan originator to an unaffiliated financial firm,8 and another finds that a loan portfolio
that was securitized was 20% more likely to default than a similar portfolio that was not
securitized.9 The implication seems obvious: loan originators dumped their weaker loans
on investment banks that were seeking to assemble quickly loan portfolios for
securitizations.
These trends, particularly the absence of adequate documentation, should have
been evident to the CRAs. Why were they oblivious? Here, three distinctive facts about
changes in the structured finance market over the last decade need regulatory attention.
First, as structured financed issuances overtook corporate debt issuances (by around
2002), the nature of the CRA’s clientele changed. When the CRAs principally rated
corporate bonds, no one client accounted for 1% of their business (because even large
corporations went to the bond market only intermittently). But as structured finance
became the CRAs’ principal profit center, the rating agencies faced a limited number of
large investment banks that brought deals to them on a continuing basis (and thus could
threaten to take a substantial volume of business elsewhere, if dissatisfied). The high

8

Atif Mian and Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the
2007 Mortgage Default Crisis, NBER Working Paper No. W13936 (April 2008).
9
B. Keys, T. Mukherjee, A. Seru, & V. Vig., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening?
Evidence from Subprime Loans, 2001-2006, (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2093137).
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level of concentration in the market for subprime mortgage securitizations is shown by
Exhibit B below:
Exhibit B
MBS Underwriters in 2007: A Very Concentrated Market

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Book Runner
Lehman Brothers
Bear Stearns & Co., Inc.
Morgan Stanley
JP Morgan
Credit Suisse
Bank of America Securities LLC
Deutsche Bank AG
Royal Bank of Scotland Group
Merrill Lynch
Goldman Sachs & Co.
Citigroup
UBS

Number of
Offerings
120
128
92
95
109
101
85
74
81
60
95
74

Market
Share
10.80%
9.90%
8.20%
7.90%
7.50%
6.80%
6.20%
5.80%
5.20%
5.10%
5.00%
4.30%

Proceed Amount +
Overallotment Sold
in US ($mill)
$100,109
$91,696
$75,627
$73,214
$69,503
$62,776
$57,337
$53,352
$48,407
$47,696
$46,754
$39,832

As this table shows, the top six underwriters listed above controlled over 50% of this
market, and the top dozen accounted for over 80%. As a result, they possessed the ability
to threaten credibly that they would take their business elsewhere – a threat that the rating
agencies had not previously experienced. In recent testimony before a U.S. Senate
Committee, a former Managing Director of Moody’s with responsibility for supervising
their subprime mortgage ratings testified that it was well understood within Moody’s that
even a small loss of market share would result in a manager’s termination.10

10

See Statement of Eric Kolchinsky before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, April 23, 2010 at 1-3.
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This development was exacerbated by the second major change occurring in this
market in the decade prior to 2008: namely, heightened competition among the CRAs,
caused by the rise of Fitch Ratings. As Becker and Milbourn have shown,11 Fitch’s
monthly share of U.S. credit ratings between 1998 and 2006 rose from a low of 20% in
2000 to a peak of 45% in 2006:

This sharp rise was the consequence of a series of acquisitions of smaller rating agencies
(Duff & Phelps and Thomson Bankwatch) that Fitch’s new parent undertook in 2000 as
part of a strategy to build up Fitch’s market share.
For many commentators, competition is exactly what the market for credit ratings
needed. But Becker and Milbourne find that it in fact led to a significant inflation in
ratings. As the following diagram shows, the percentage of investment grade ratings went
11

Bo Becker and Todd Milbourn, Reputation and Competition: Evidence from the Credit Rating
Industry, HBS Finance Working Paper 09-051 (2008).
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up with greater competition, and the percentage of non-investment ratings went down –
in both cases for every rating:

By no means does this data truly prove that competition cannot work, but the shift
from a duopoly to a three-way oligopoly appears to have challenged both Moody’s and
S&P. A recent Congressional hearing featured former employees of the CRAs who
testified that their firm’s culture changed around 2000, and the loss of even a small
percentage of market share produced pressure from within the firm to relax rating
standards.12
The third secular change that adversely affected CRA performance was the sharp
reduction after 2000 in factual verification and due diligence. Factual verification of the
creditworthiness of securitized mortgages largely disappeared after 2000, as investment
12

See Statement of Eric Kolchinsky, supra note 10.
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banks and deal arrangers ceased to pay for such activities, and CRAs did not insist on
their continuation. Although this development will be discussed in more detail later, it
appears to have been driven less by the desire to economize on expenses than by a desire
to suppress the “red flags” that factual investigations would uncover about the
deterioration in credit quality in the subprime mortgage field.
B. How Were Ratings Inflated?: The Role of Discretion in Ratings
The foregoing discussion has emphasized the significance of conflicts of interest
in the rating process. But how did these conflicts actually impact the rating process?
Here, the real question is: why were risky subprime mortgages able to be rated
investment grade (and, more specifically, AAA) when they were collected into
portfolios? The initial answer, of course, involves tranching and elaborate subordination.
In theory, collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) received AAA ratings, because rating
agencies concluded that sufficient debt obligations had been subordinated to the senior
tranche to justify rating that senior tranche AAA. In light of their subsequent failure,
however, the question becomes: was the level of subordination sufficient? Here, a recent
2010 study by Griffin and Tang of 916 CDOs issued between January 1997 and
December 2007 finds that the CRAs did not follow a consistent policy or valuation model
with respect to subordination, but rather regularly made “adjustments” on subjective
grounds.13 Although these adjustments could be either positive or negative, 84% of these
adjustments were in fact positive, and these adjustments increased the size of the toprated AAA tranche by “an additional 12.1% of the AAA at the time of issue.”14 These

13

See John M. Griffin and Dragon Yongjun Tang, Did Subjectivity Play A Role in CDO Credit
Ratings?, (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364933) (2009).
14
Id. at 4.
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discretionary adjustments, they find, “explain why CDO tranches are large and similar in
size despite varying CDO structures.”15 Less surprisingly, they further find that the
amount of the adjustment was positively correlated with future downgrades. In short, the
evidence shows not that the CRAs’ valuation models were wrong, but that they were
systematically overridden in a manner that increased the size of AAA tranches.
The degree to which CRAs overrode their own models to increase the size of the
senior tranche that could now be rated AAA appears both extraordinary and largely based
on discretionary upward adjustments. Griffin and Tang report that “only 1.4% of AAA
CDOs closed between January 1997 and March 2007 met the rating agency’s reported
AAA default standard,”16 with the rest falling short. Ultimately, they “estimate that the
AAA tranches would have been rated BBB on average” and that the aggregate
overvaluation of the CDOs in their sample of 916 CDOs was $86.22 billion.17
In making these discretionary adjustments, the CRAs appear to have been
acquiescing in the desires of the investment banks that engineered these securitizations.
By increasing the size of the AAA tranche, the rating agencies made the CDO both more
valuable and, at least as important, easier to sell (as lower rated tranches could only be
sold to a much smaller audience). Hull estimates that often as much as “$90 of AAArated securities [were] ultimately created from each $100 of subprime mortgages.”18
Because subprime borrowers are by definition poor credit risks, he estimates that the
typical subprime borrower “would at best be rated BBB” and thus, he finds, it was highly
15

Id.
Id.
17
Id. at 5.
18
John Hull, Credit Ratings and the Securitization of Subprime Mortgages, (Paper presented at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2010 Financial Markets Conference, “Up from the Ashes:
The Financial System After the Crisis,” May 11, 2010) at 4-5.
16
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unlikely that any financial alchemy could generate $90 of AAA-rated instruments from
$100 of BBB-rated mortgages.19
The conclusions reached by Griffin and Tang have recently been expressly
confirmed by an even larger study by the staff of the New York Federal Reserve Bank.20
Using a uniquely large data set that covered 60,000 MBS securities issued between 20012007, or “nearly 90% of the deals issued during this period,”21 they find that risk-adjusted
subordination declined “significantly between the start of 2005 and 2007”22; as a result, a
greater percentage of the total offering was rated AAA. Their most striking finding is that
“deals with a high share of low- and no-documentation loans (“low doc”) perform
disproportionately poorly, even relative to other types of risky deals” – implying to them
that these loans were not rated conservatively enough on an ex ante basis.23 Unlike other
studies, they do not find a steady decline from 2001 to 2007, but rather a sudden decline
in 2005 to 2007, when a record number of deals came to market and when (in their view)
the reputational costs of error became modest in relation to the expected profits to the
ratings agency.
Although CDOs were supposed to be supported by a foundation of subordinated
junior tranches, the level of subordination was always thin. In the case of subprime deals,
the AAA tranche constituted on average 82.4% of all the securities in the portfolio over
the period from 2001 to 2007 (and some years was over as 90%), and in “Alt-A deals,”
19

Id. at 4-5. In fact, on the typical “Alt-A deal,” the earlier noted Federal Reserve Bank study
finds that, over the period from 2001 to 2007, $100 of “Alt-A” mortgages generated on average
approximately $93.1 of AAA-rated CDO debt securities. See Ashcroft, Goldsmith-Pinkham and
Vickery, supra note 7, at Table 3.
20
See Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery, supra note 7, at 31.
21
Id. at 2.
22
Id. at 3.
23
Id. at 3-4.
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the AAA-rated tranche represented over 93% of the securities in the CDO pool over the
same period.24
This willingness of the ratings agencies to tolerate “thin” subordination and award
AAA ratings to top-heavy securitization structures transcended the special field of
subprime mortgages. In the related field of commercial mortgage-backed securitizations
(“CMBS”), there was no general decline in the quality of the collateral (as there was in
the case of residential mortgages), and the rate of default on such loans did not increase
appreciably. Thus, ratings should have remained relatively reliable. Yet, studying a
comprehensive sample of CMBS transactions from 1996 to 2008, Stanton and Wallace
find that the CMBS market collapsed during the 2008-2009 financial crisis because
ratings agencies permitted subordination levels to be reduced by issuers until they
provided insufficient protection for the supposedly safe senior tranches.25 This finding
uncercuts the argument of the ratings agencies that they were blindsided by sudden
changes in the subprime mortgage arena. To the contrary, the rating agencies appear to
have tolerated thin subordination across a variety of contexts, as issuers and underwriters
pressured them to compete.
C. Unique Among Gatekeepers, the CRAs Did Not Verify or Confirm Factual
Information Upon Which Their Models Relied.
Unlike auditors, securities analysts, attorneys, investment banks and other
financial gatekeepers, CRAs do not conduct factual verification with respect to the

24

Id. at Table 3.
See Richard Stanton and Nancy Wallace, “CMBS Subordination, Ratings Inflation and the
Crisis of 2007-2009,” NBER Working Paper No. 16206 (July 2010) (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1648006).

25
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information on which their valuation models rely.26 While accountants are quite literally
“bean counters” and security analysts contact all possible sources of information
(customers, suppliers, rivals) to obtain information about an issuer, CRAs simply disclose
that they are relying on information supplied to them by others. The problem, of course,
is that no model, however well designed, can outperform its informational inputs;
unverified data results in the well-known “GIGO Effect” – Garbage In, Garbage Out.
Due diligence did, however, use to be part of the process. Prior to 2000, the
ratings agencies usually had a generally reliable source of information about the quality
of the collateral in securitization pools. During this period prior to 2000, investment
banks outsourced the task of due diligence on asset-backed securitizations to specialized
“due diligence” firms. These firms (of which Clayton Holdings, Inc. was probably the
best known) would send squads of loan reviewers to sample the loans in a portfolio to be
purchased from a financial institution or loan originator, checking credit scores and
documentation. Although this sampling fell well short of an audit, it could identify the
likely percentage of “problem” loans in the portfolio. But the intensity of this due
diligence review declined after 2000. The Los Angeles Times quotes the CEO of Clayton
Holdings to the effect that:
“Early in the decade, a securities firm might have asked Clayton to review
25% to 40% of the sub-prime loans in a pool, compared with typically
10% in 2006…”27

26

For this conclusion, see U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Summary Report of
Issues Identified in the Commission’s Staff’s Examination of Select Credit Rating Agencies”
(July 2008) at p. 18 (noting that CRAs “did not engage in any due diligence or otherwise seek to
verify the accuracy or quality of the loan data underlying the RMBS pools they rated.”).
27
See E. Scott Reckard, “Sub-Prime mortgage watchdogs kept on leash; loan checkers say their
warnings of risk were met with indifference,” Los Angeles Times, March 17, 2008 at C-1.
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The President of a leading rival due diligence firm, the Bohan Group, made an even more
revealing comparison:
“By contrast, loan buyers who kept the mortgages as an investment instead
of packaging them into securities would have 50% to 100% of the loans
examined, Bohan President Mark Hughes said.”28
In short, lenders who retained the loans checked the borrowers reasonably carefully, but
the investment banks decreased their investment in due diligence, making only an
increasingly cursory effort as the bubble inflated. This evidence is consistent with the
earlier finding that loans in a securitized portfolio defaulted at a significantly higher rate.
The actual “due diligence” personnel employed by these firms also told the
above-quoted Los Angeles Times reporter that supervisors in these firms would often
change documentation in order to avoid “red-flagging mortgages.” These employees also
report regularly encountering inflated documentation and “liar’s loans,” but, even when
they rejected loans, “loan buyers often bought the rejected mortgages anyway.”29 In
short, even when the watchdog barked, no one at the investment banks truly paid
attention, and no one told the rating agencies.
All these elements converge to support a classic “moral hazard” story: those who
did not expect to hold these loans for long invested increasingly less in investigating their
creditworthiness and indeed repressed adverse information by ceasing to inquire.
Concomitantly, they began to subordinate less of the portfolio in riskier tranches in order
to increase the size of the more valuable top-rated tranche. The bottom line then appears
to be that an “originate and distribute” business model does lead to lax screening and
deceptively below average loan portfolios.
28
29
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Other critiques of the CRAs have also been convincingly made: (1) they were
slow to revise their ratings or downgrade securities; (2) they tend to “herd” or converge
over time on a common rating (probably because a common error does not result in
unique reputational damage);30 and (3) they did not adequately disclose their valuation
models. But these critiques, while probably valid, had less to do with the 2008 financial
crisis and so will receive less attention.
Part II: The Debate Over Possible Reforms:
Where to Place Society’s Bets
CRA failure is an important aspect of the broader problem of systemic risk.
Unless a reliable watchdog can monitor the creditworthiness of CDOs and other assetbacked securitizations, these securities will either remain unmarketable or will endure
highly volatile “boom and bust” cycles. Still, reformers divide between (1) those who
want to subject CRAs to closer regulation to purge the rating process of conflicts of
interest, and (2) those who believe that the answer is deregulation through downsizing the
role of credit ratings. This section will briefly review recent developments and then
survey the range of reforms that have been proposed.
A. Developments Over the Last Five Years.
1. The United States. In both the United States and Europe, credit rating agencies
were not directly regulated for most of their existence. On the statutory level, this
changed only in 2006 in the United States, and prospective changes have only been
proposed this year in Europe. However, although the CRAs were not regulated, many
30

See Andre Gutler, Lead-Lag Relationships and Rating Convergence Among Credit Rating
Agencies, (European Bus. Sch. Research Paper No. 09-14, 2009) (available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1488164) (finding that Moody’s closely tracks S&P upgrades, but not its downgrades).
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discretionary.
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institutional investors were. In the United States, banking and financial regulators have
long required institutional investors and broker dealers to obtain ratings for debt
securities they wished to hold in their portfolios in order to enable prudential-based
regulation to distinguish safe investments from speculative ones. Beginning in 1975, the
SEC required that such ratings be issued by “nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations” (“NRSROs”).31 Effectively, this NRSRO requirement meant that rating
agencies not so designated by the SEC could not issue ratings on which institutions and
broker-dealers could rely for these regulatory purposes. CRAs excluded from the
“NRSRO” club were thus prejudiced because their ratings carried a lesser value.
Curiously, the SEC never officially defined the term “NRSRO,” nor did it
establish formal criteria governing admission to the NRSRO club. Instead, the SEC’s
staff used a vaguer and ultimately question-begging test that looked to whether an
applicant was “nationally recognized by the professional users of ratings in the United
States as an issuer of credible and reliable ratings.”32 Between 1975 and 2006, the SEC
generally refused to confer the NRSRO designation on most credit rating applicants,
apparently because it feared that new and “fly-by-night” rating agencies would be more
generous in awarding investment grade ratings and thereby lead a race to the bottom.
The SEC’s conservatism in approving new NRSROs drew criticism (particularly
from excluded firms). Equally important, in the wake of the Enron, WorldCom and
related corporate scandals in the 2001-2002 period, the existing NRSROs became
politically vulnerable when they had clearly failed to detect approaching financial
31

For a fuller background, see John C. Coffee, Jr., GATEKEEPERS: The Professions and
Corporate Governance (2006) at 293-297.
32
See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on the Role and Function of Credit
Rating Agencies In the Operation of the Securities Markets (2003) at 9.
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disasters (the often-cited illustration is that none of the NRSROs downgraded Enron until
a day or two before its bankruptcy). Following a series of critical studies, Congress
enacted the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, which created an objective
registration framework that sought to both facilitate entry by new agencies into the
NRSRO market and to mandate greater accountability by existing NRSROs. Although
the 2006 Act did authorize broad rule-making by the SEC to restrict conflicts of interest,
it expressly denied the SEC the power to “regulate the substance of credit ratings or the
procedures or methodologies by which an NRSRO determines credit ratings.”33 This
compromise under which the SEC can restrict conflicts of interest, require disclosure, and
monitor performance, but not regulate the methodologies or models by which ratings are
determined reflected a Congressional view that the SEC lacked the expertise to prescribe
models to the CRAs, but could evaluate the consistency of application by each CRA. This
compromise will remain in force even under the currently pending legislation passed by
the two houses of the U.S. Congress.
Pursuant to the powers granted it by the 2006 Act, the SEC has promulgated a
series of rules to (1) govern the registration procedure; (2) provide detailed disclosure as
to the experience with the ratings issued by each NRSRO rating agency, (3) regulate
conflicts of interest, and (4) encourage competition. Probably the most noteworthy of
these rules is Rule 17g-5, which expressly prohibits some seven types of conflicts of
interest.34 Even more importantly, Rule 17g-5 was amended in 2009 to create an “equal
access” obligation. Under it, when an NRSRO is hired by an issuer or other arranger to
33

See Section 15E(c)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2).
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On Regulating Conflict of Interests in the Credit Rating Industry, 13 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub.
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determine an initial credit rating for a structured finance product, it must make available
the information it receives from the issuer or arranger to other NRSROs (but not to the
public generally) in order to enable them to issue their own ratings.35 The intent of this
“equal access” rule is to encourage competition by allowing potential competitors to
obtain the same information given by the issuer to the CRA that it hires. In short,
although this rule is based on the SEC’s power to regulate conflicts of interest, its
primary intent is to foster competition.
Pursuant to the 2006 Act, the SEC has been required to admit any NRSRO
applicant that can make an adequate showing of competence, and the SEC has in fact
expanded the number of NRSROs to ten (with several applications pending that are likely
to be successful). Still, the Big Three (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings)
have remained dominant (with the new CRAs largely focusing on specialized market
niches or rating foreign firms based in their own jurisdiction). This result suggests that
the regulatory power assigned to the Big Three by the NRSRO system does not truly
explain their market dominance. Even during the 1975-2006 period, a few new entrants
were admitted by the SEC to the NRSRO club, but they were unable to compete
successfully (and were acquired by the Big Three). Uniquely, Fitch Ratings did become
competitive with Moody’s and S&P, but it had specialized in structured finance and
thereby had acquired a competitive headstart over its rivals (Moody’s was in fact slow to
enter the structured finance field). Overall, this pattern suggests that there are important
“first mover” advantages because reputational capital is hard to acquire and goes to the
first firms in the field. If licensing power alone could explain the dominance of the Big
35
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Three, then the newer members of the SEC’s “NRSRO Club” would have joined and
shared in their oligopoly.
2. Europe. In comparison to the United States, Europe has traditionally not
regulated CRAs. Following the Enron scandal in 2001, the Committee of European
Securities Regulators (“CESR”) conducted a study for the European Union Commission
(the “Commission”) that ultimately concluded that legislation was not necessary to
regulate the CRAs. Instead, the Commission relied on a Code of Conduct developed by
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) to ensure the
accountability of the CRAs. The Commission designated CESR the responsibility of
monitoring compliance with this Code and instructed CESR to report to the Commission
annually. In 2006, after the first such report from CESR, the Commission again
concluded that, although it saw problems with the performance of the CRAs, these
problems were not sufficient to require legislation.36
Under the IOSCO Code of Conduct approach, each CRA adopted a voluntary
code, typically using the IOSCO Code as its model. CRAs could deviate from the IOSCO
Code if they chose, but they had to disclose any departures pursuant to the EU’s
traditional “comply or explain” system of self regulation.
Well established as the “comply or explain” model was in Europe, the 2008
financial crisis has caused Europe to abandon it in the case of the CRAs in favor of a
mandatory system of registration and administrative supervision. The process began in
2009, when the European Parliament adopted a “Proposal by the European Commission
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for a Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies.”37 This initial regulation introduced the
principle of mandatory registration for credit rating agencies operating in Europe, but it
was not then clear who would supervise the CRAs. Then, on June 2, 2010, the European
Commission proposed a revision to this regulation to create a pan-European body – the
European Security Markets Authority (or “ESMA”) – that would be given exclusive
supervisory authority over credit rating agencies registered in Europe.38 Backstopping
this supervision would be new powers given to the ESMA to investigate, impose fines,
and suspend or terminate a CRA’s license. The proposal requires approval by the
European Parliament and member governments, but it is particularly noteworthy in that it
would represent the initial pan-European body with day-to-day regulatory authority over
the securities markets.
In some important respects, the EU Regulation resembles the SEC’s approach,
both in the requirement of registration and in a common “equal access” rule intended to
promote competition. The ESMA, however, would have marginally greater authority than
the SEC, because it would be empowered to evaluate the methodologies and procedures
used by the CRA to rate securities. Under the proposed EU Regulation, CRAs must
periodically review their methodologies, adopt reasonable measures to assure the
reliability of the information relied upon by their models, and ensure that their employees
are adequately trained and have appropriate knowledge and experience. In general, the
EU Regulation is framed in broad and non-specific terms and at this stage focuses more

37
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on establishing a framework for supervision than on mandating specific prophylactic
rules.
3. The New Convergence. As a result of the EU Regulation, recent amendments
to the IOSCO Code of Conduct, and the SEC’s rules, the U.S. and Europe seem to be
converging. Both SEC Rule 17g-5 and the IOSCO Code seek to reduce conflicts of
interest by (1) barring an NRSRO or similar European CRA from issuing a rating with
respect to an obligor or security where it has advised or consulted on the design or
structuring of the security,39 and (2) prohibiting an analyst who participates in the rating
determination from negotiating the fee that the issuer or arranger pays for it.40 The first
prohibition is designed to discourage the provision of consulting services to issuers by
rating agencies, and seems modeled on similar prohibitions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
that precluded auditing firms from providing defined consulting services to audit clients
for fear that the provision of such services would exacerbate conflicts of interest; the
second prohibition on analyst involvement in fee negotiations similarly seeks to protect
the professional independence of the analyst (much as the “global settlement” reached by
U.S. regulators in 2002 with the major investment banks sought to distance securities
analysts from any involvement in marketing activities). Building on the IOSCO Code of
Conduct, the EU Regulation would similarly bar a rating agency from providing
consulting or advisory services to a client whose securities it is rating.
39
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Convergence is also evident in the common requirements under the SEC rules and
the EU Regulation that CRAs disclose their methodologies, models and key rating
assumptions. Similarly, recent revisions to the IOSCO Code follow the SEC in endorsing
a form of an “equal access” rule under which issuers are encouraged to make public
disclosure of all information provided by an issuer that is used by a CRA in rating an
asset-backed security. If established, ESMA would presumably make this norm
mandatory.
Given this high level of convergence (albeit with fewer mandatory rules or
enforcement mechanisms in Europe), the important questions become: (1) What
important topics have not yet been addressed?; and (2) Are there areas in which Europe
and the U.S. do not agree? One obvious example of the latter is the reported plan of the
European Commission to establish a regional European rating agency to compete with
the Big Three.41 No similar idea has been proposed in the U.S. At least in part, this
proposal appears attributable to the fact that Moody’s and S&P are American firms and,
perhaps even more, to the action of the Big Three in recently downgrading European
sovereign debt (most notably that of Greece) in a manner that was perceived to have
exacerbated the recent European financial crisis in 2010.
In addition, although some conflicts of interest have been addressed, neither the
SEC nor the EU Commission has yet addressed the “issuer pays” business model of the
CRAs or the highly concentrated character of the CRA market. The next section surveys
these areas.
B. An Overview of the Choices Not Yet Faced

41

See sources cited supra at note 38.
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In some areas, the U.S. and Europe still diverge; in other areas (such as the
promotion of competition and the control of conflicts of interest), neither has yet fully
resolved how to implement its goals.
A. Litigation and Deterrence-Based Reforms.
Consistent with the U.S.’s preferences to rely on liability-based reforms, the U.S.
House of Representatives passed legislation in December, 2009, which contained a
provision subjecting CRAs to liability for gross negligence. Section 6003(c) of H.R. 4173
provided that a purchaser of a rated security “shall have the right to recover for damages
if the process of determining the credit rating was (1) grossly negligent, based on the
facts and circumstances at the time the rating was issued, and (2) a substantial factor in
the economic loss suffered by the investor.” Differing markedly from the antifraud
provisions in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (which generally require the plaintiff
to plead and prove a fraudulent intent on the part of the defendant), this provision would
have made it far easier for plaintiffs to sue a rating agency than to sue the issuer or
underwriter of the security. In 1995, as a protection against “frivolous” litigation, the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (or “PSLRA”) adopted strict pleading rules that
required a plaintiff in a securities fraud action to plead facts with particularity that “give
rise to a strong inference of fraud” before it can obtain discovery. These rules would have
been effectively inapplicable to a negligence-based action against a CRA and thus would
have tilted the playing field substantially toward the plaintiff. Unusual as it is to hold a
secondary participant legally responsible under a more relaxed and pro-plaintiff standard
than the issuer, the House provision clearly reflected the Congressional (and public)
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anger at the rating agencies, who seem to many to have been the gatekeepers that failed
the worst during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
Utlimately, the U.S. Congress declined to adopt the House’s negligence standard
and instead opted for the liability provision in the later passed Senate Bill. The Senate
Bill (whose liability provision was drafted initially by this author and is later discussed in
more detail) used a more traditional antifraud standard. Essentially, the Senate Bill
coupled a fraud-based standard with a safe harbor that becomes applicable when the CRA
conducts or obtains factual verification of the key elements in its ratings model. Thus, the
Senate Bill’s goal was more focused on encouraging due diligence than imposing
damages.
Although the Dodd-Frank Act expressly enhances the liability of the CRAs, a
Constitutional question mark still hangs over this area that could nullify this new liability
provision. Some judicial decisions in the U.S. have viewed credit ratings as expressions
of opinion protected by the First Amendment.42 The case law in the United States is
currently divided on this question,43 and no authoritative answer is possible until the
Supreme Court addresses the issue.
Still, from a policy perspective, does negligence-based liability make sense?
Although the case for enhanced liability may be strong, three distinct policy reasons
suggest that a liberalized negligence standard is ill-advised. First, a negligence standard
42
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could easily bankrupt the CRAs, as a single case could produce a billion dollar (or
greater) judgment. Second, the threat of a negligence standard could lead the CRAs to
withdraw from rating risky structured finance products (and similarly chill new entrants
from entering this field). Indeed, if the CRAs were to cease to rate structured finance
products because of this standard, housing finance in the U.S. might remain paralyzed.
Third, and most importantly, the appropriate legislative goal should be deterrence, not
compensation. Given that trillions of dollars in structured finance products have been
marketed globally, there is no realistic possibility that the credit rating agencies could
fund meaningful compensation to most their victims. Their pockets are simply not deep
enough to cover even a small percentage of the losses associated with structured finance.
If so, the realistic objective should be to focus deterrence on the CRAs so that in
the future they conduct adequate due diligence and update their financial models to
reflect new developments. On this premise, any cause of action against the CRAs should
logically be coupled with a ceiling on liability to ensure that the deterrent threat does not
lead to the financial destruction of an arguably necessary financial intermediary. Indeed,
this danger is especially acute in the case of a CRA, because its mistakes are typically
interlinked and involve multiple securities issuances. That is, an error in its valuation
model or any shortcoming in its verification procedures may produce inflated ratings in
the case of dozens (or even hundreds) of issuers (with billions of dollars in damages
thereby resulting). In contrast, an error by an auditor will likely produce only inaccurate
financial statements in the case of one issuer. Put differently, because a misjudgment by a
CRA may enable a far greater dollar volume of securities to be sold, the need for
deterrence is strong, but the case for a ceiling on its liability may even be stronger.
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B. Employee Compensation-Based Reforms.
In principle, the accuracy of a credit rating is only demonstrated over the longrun, but the payment for it is made in the short-run. This mismatch can create agency
problems, as the managers who determine the rating may not expect (or intend) to be
around at the end of the ratings cycle. In effect, they may hope to obtain incentive
compensation in the short-run reflecting their firm’s increased ratings revenue, even
though their mispricing of risk has created a much greater long-term liability for their
employer. To deal with this mismatch, some have proposed compensation constraints.
For example, at the entity level, the fee to the CRA could conceivably be placed in
escrow until the bond was paid off; alternatively, the law could entitle investors to
“clawback” the fee if the rating proved inaccurate (i.e., in the event of a default,
downgrade, or some other “credit event”). At the manager level, salaries or other
compensation could be similarly clawed back by the rating agency. Alternatively – and
perhaps more feasibly – the manager could become entitled to bonuses or other incentive
compensation at the conclusion of the ratings cycle if the rating proved accurate.
Although logical in theory, these compensation-based proposals encounter
overwhelming practical difficulties. Rating fees cannot easily be placed in escrow for the
life of the bond without creating severe liquidity problems for the ratings agency. Equally
important, if the rating proves inflated, the issuer who paid the CRA for that rating should
hardly be entitled to a seeming windfall profit by enabling it to recapture its fee. Only the
injured investor deserves any repayment, and it wants restitution of its loss, not a mere
clawback of the rating agency’s fees. Clawbacks directed at employees and former
employees may also be difficult to enforce – particularly years after the inaccurate rating
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was issued. Nor is it clear that the CRA should be entitled to a clawback from its own
analysts. Indeed, if the inflated rating was the result of pressure by the rating agency on
its employee (backed up by the implicit threat of dismissal if the employee lost “market
share”), then arming the employer with a right to “clawback” the employee’s
compensation rewards the principal culprit. In any event, employees who are motivated
to inflate ratings by fear of demotion or dismissal are unlikely to find the distant threat of
a clawback in future years sufficient to offset fully the shorter-term pressure.
Subtler variations on compensation formulas can be imagined. Listokin and
Talbleson have suggested that rating fees should be paid to the CRA in the rated
securities in order that the cost of the overvaluation of the rate securities would fall on the
rating agency.44 Clever as this idea is in principle, it would not work if the rating agency
could immediately sell the debt securities before their misrating was discovered. If it
cannot, it must hold a sizable portfolio of securities with resulting liquidity and legal
problems.45 Also, if the rating fee was a basis point (or less) of the deal size, this system
would involve the issuance of small amounts of debt securities (and in odd
denominations) to the rating agency. It is inefficient to hold or trade small quantities of a
large number of illiquid debt securities (as the CRA would incur disproportionate
brokerage fees).
C. Curbing Conflicts of Interest and the “Issuer Pays” Business Model
The most obvious conflict of interest that potentially undercuts the credit rating
agency’s independence and objectivity is the simple fact that the issuer pays the rating
44
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agency’s fee. At some point in the mid-1970s, the credit rating agencies shifted to this
business model after finding that they could be no more than marginally profitable
operating on a subscription basis under which investors paid for their ratings.46
Obvious as the conflict in an “issuer pays” model is, two points must be
immediately made about the realism of seeking to eliminate it: (1) Most financial
gatekeepers – auditors, law firms, investment banks – operate under a similar model
under which the issuer pays their fees; and (2) A “subscriber pays” model may be
doomed to failure by the “public goods” nature of ratings. Because the rating agency
cannot effectively prevent the communication of its ratings to non-paying investors once
it discloses its ratings to its clients, it cannot capture the full value of the financial
information that it creates. For example, a subscriber may leak the rating information to
another institutional investor, possibly in return for some reciprocal favor (including
disclosure of the rating issued by some other rating agency). As a result, free riders will
inevitably acquire and rely on the information without compensating the creator – in
effect, the standard “non-excludibility” criterion that defines a public good. Indeed, some
have argued that the principal CRAs encountered this free riding problem in the early
1970s, which lead them to shift to the “issuer pays” model.47
Thus, the more feasible response to the conflict of interest inherent in the “issuer
pays” model may to permit the issuer to pay for the rating, but not to select the rater. This
strategy would also respond to the independent problem of “rating shopping,” under
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which issuers seek preliminary ratings and then choose the agency giving it the highest
preliminary rating to issue the final rating.
From this starting point, the next step is to consider the alternative means by
which the rating agency could be chosen. Three obvious alternatives are apparent, but
each could be further refined in a variety of ways:
1. The Government As Hiring Agent: The selection of the rating agency could be
given to some independent agency. In 2010, the U.S. Senate recently voted in favor of
this option, approving by a large majority an amendment offered by Senator Al Franken
(D-Minn.) to the then pending Dodd-Frank Act. The Franken Amendment would have
created a “Credit Agency Review Board” (the “Board”), which would choose the initial
rater for all “structured financial products.” The issuer would remain free to (1) secure no
rating at all, or (2) hire additional rating agencies if it wished. As proposed, the Board
would be established under the SEC and subject to its oversight. Although the Board
would not determine the fee to be paid by the issuer to the rating agency, the SEC is
instructed by the legislation to place a “reasonable” ceiling on the fee (both to prevent
overcharging by the rating agency and implicit bribery by the issuer).
Ultimately, the Franken Amendment was watered down in the final revisions of
the Dodd-Frank Act so that the SEC must first conduct a study of the feasibility of its
approach. Following that study (which must be conducted within two years of the Act’s
passage), the SEC is authorized to adopt the equivalent of, or a variant on, the Franken
Amendment.48 In short, this proposal remains very much on the table for discussion and
modification.
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2. Encouraging a “Subscriber Pays” Model: Another way to avoid issuer
domination of the rating determination would be to require institutional investors to
obtain their own ratings (and from a rating agency not retained by the issuer or
underwriters) before they could purchase the debt securities. The issuer would also
remain free to hire its own rating agency, but each institutional investor would need to
obtain its own independent rating. The goal of this approach is to spur the growth of a
“subscriber pays” market. Its key premise is that a “subscriber pays” market will not
develop on its own (as it clearly has not to date) so long as investors are free to rely on an
“issuer-paid” rating. Some reformers would go even further and seek to mandate or
encourage the formation of investor owned rating agencies on the premise that they
would be bias free.49 Still, this belief that institutions will form their own ratings
agencies probably posits a stronger investor interest in ratings reform than it is realistic to
assume most institutions have. Nonetheless, even if institutions will resist expending
funds on ratings, groups of institutions presumably might economize on their fees under a
mandatory “subscriber pays” system by jointly hiring an independent rating agency at a
discounted “wholesale” price. Thus, the costs to them are not prohibitive.
3. The Government Utility Model: A last alternative is a government-created and
managed rating agency, and the E.U. is currently considering such an approach on a
regional basis. This “Governmental Utility Model” could be designed to be a check on
the private market – much as the Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) was created in the
U.S. during the New Deal era as a check and yardstick by which to measure the

49

For such a proposal, see Joseph Grundfest and Evgeniya E. Hochenberg, “Investor Owned and
Controlled Rating Agencies: A Summary Introduction,” Rock Center for Corporate Governance
Working Paper No. 66 (October 25, 2009) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1494527).

-33-

performance of privately owned public utilities. That is, it would not be an exclusive
rater, but investors would compare the Moody’s or S&P rating against the governmental
rating.
4. A Policy Evaluation. Each approach has its own advantages and disadvantages.
Using the government (or its proxy) as the neutral party who selects the initial rating
agency is simple and direct and should assure the independence of the chosen rater. More
questionable, however, is whether the rating agency so chosen will have credibility.
Conceivably, this approach potentially provides politicians with an enormous patronage
system. How do we ensure that political loyalties and contributions do not influence the
selection of the initial, government-appointed rating agency? The Franken Amendment
provides that independent commissioners chosen by the SEC would perform this
function, but it also permits its Credit Rating Agency Review Board to use either a lottery
or a rotating assignment system. The sheer volume of initial ratings may compel such a
mechanical approach because the Board may find it infeasible to make individualized
decisions in every case.
Although random or rotation assignments might protect against political
favoritism and probably would encourage new entrants to apply to become NRSROs (in
the U.S. parlance) in order to obtain initial rating assignments, the problem with such a
system is that it creates little incentive for rating agencies to compete based on the quality
of their ratings. The participants simply do not need to win the favor of investors. In
addition, the new entrants might charge inflated fees because they would not need to
compete. Thus, if we are concerned about encouraging factual verification and due
diligence, the participants under this system would have little incentive to invest in costly
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research or conduct factual verification. Effectively, they might behave much like civil
servants or tenured academics, placidly enjoying the quiet life.
Of course, the Board might instead choose the initial rating agency based on the
CRA’s prior record for accuracy. But this is easier said than done. A reliable track record
for accuracy might take a decade or more to develop. New entrants would also have little
prior experience upon which to rest any claim to demonstrated accuracy, and thus they
would be prejudiced. In theory, the debt securities would have to repaid or redeemed
before the full rating cycle was completed and the accuracy of the rating could be
determined. If the board were to prefer established raters with a demonstrated history of
rating accuracy, this would largely perpetuate the existing oligopoly of the Big Three and
might subject the Board to criticism for failing to encourage greater competition. Hence,
political pressures and Congressional expectations seem likely to compel the Board to
favor either rotating assignments or some other technique that gave a substantial share of
initial rating assignments to firms outside the Big Three.
Another problem might be the response of the Big Three to such a system. If the
Big Three rating agencies elected to operate only as “issuer-paid” rating agencies and
thus did not seek initial ratings from this Board, most of the initial raters would be
relatively unknown raters whose opinions might not command much respect in the
market. In short, there are risks that the initial raters would be both under-motivated and
ignored, unless a more demanding selection criterion gave them greater credibility.
The second alternative – i.e., requiring institutions to obtain a credit rating from
the rating agency of their choice (provided that it was not also paid by the issuer) – has
the key advantage of encouraging greater competition. New rating firms would enter this
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market to compete for this business (probably on the accurate assumption that Moody’s
and S&P would remain committed to an “issuer pays” business model). Under such a
“subscriber pays” system, the free rider problem would also diminish in its significance,
because each substantial institutional investor would be required to hire a rating agency
for its advice.50 A market would thus be assured. Reputational capital would now count
for something, and the rating agency might deliver a fuller report, not simply a two or
three letter rating. Candidly, however, it must be recognized that investors are likely to
resist having to pay themselves for a rating. Securities analysts have similarly found
investors resistant to paying for investment advice. Although a “subscriber pays” model
could be legally mandated, investors are likely to constitute a powerful political lobby
against such a reform – at least so long as its costs fall on them.
Another danger in this model might be that some institutional investors would opt
for the cheapest rating agency, which agency might in turn economize on its own efforts
by simply conforming to the ratings provided by the “issuer paid” rating agency. Such
“herding” is already common among both securities analysts and rating agencies.51
Given the political obstacles to imposing costs on investors, several possible
variations can be imagined. One compromise would be to allow institutions to pass on the
cost of ratings by seeking reimbursement of their rating fees from the issuer or deal
arranger. At this point, the conflict of interest problem now re-enters by the back door (as
underwriters might find ways to influence the choice of rating agency in return for
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agreeing to reimburse those costs). Reimbursement of the rating fee need not be
prohibited, but its permissibility should be clearly conditioned on the investor having an
unfettered right to choose its own rating agency.
Another bolder alternative, proposed by Grundfest and Hochenberg, envisions
that any issuer who purchases an NRSRO rating must also pay for a second rating from
an “Investor Owned and Controlled Rating Agency” (or an “IOCRA”).52 Again, this
seeks to subsidize a “subscriber-based” market. Still, the incentive of investors to form
such subsidiaries or collectives seems doubtful, in part because institutional investors are
often in active competition with each other and thus do not share information freely.
Absent the unlikely formation of such investor-owned rating agencies, the simpler
approach is to allow (or require) issuers to pay for a second rating from an investorchosen rating agency. But here the critical complication involves how investors are to
choose such a second rating agency, as the issuer cannot reasonably be expected to pay
for the choice of each investor when this might require it to retain numerous rating
agencies. One feasible answer to this problem would be to instruct the governmental
board that selects the rater under the first option discussed above to poll institutional
investors and select the rater preferred by the most institutions (possibly excluding the
rating agency retained by the issuer). In effect, the Board would defer to the investors’
choice. This would not permit every institution its individual choice, but it would still
induce rating agencies to compete for the investors’ favor. Now, the issuer could feasibly
pay for the rating under this variant on the first alternative, but predictably better, or at
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least more attentive, services would be provided by rating agencies to investors under this
approach.
Investors also have conflicts of interest that cannot be ignored. Some may choose
a rating agency that gave inflated ratings in order to enable them to purchase risky
securities with higher yields. In this light, an advantage of this last approach of an
investor vote or poll is that it mitigates the danger that “fly by night” rating agencies
would be chosen to deliver inflated ratings. Such a desire is plausible in individual cases
because an NRSRO “investment grade” rating gives legal protection to the board and
officers of a risk-preferring institutional investor in the event that a breach of fiduciary
duty claim is raised against them following a costly default. A rating agency collectively
chosen by a vote or poll of the institutions is thus preferable if we assume that the
majority of institutions are prudent and only the minority are apt to behave as riskpreferrers.
The third option of the governmental rating agency raises the clearest dangers, for
two distinct reasons. First, governmental agencies cannot pay the same salaries or
incentive compensation to analysts as firms in the private sector, with the consequence
that a “public” rating agency might have to rely on inferior personnel. Second and more
importantly, serious doubt exists that a “public” rating agency could give a negative (or
“junk”) rating to an important or politically-favored local firm. Consider whether over the
last decade a U.S. “public” rating agency would have dared to rate the bonds of General
Motors as “junk” (or non-investment grade). To be sure, the debt market might well have
known that General Motors deserved such a low rating, but political outrage would have
been predictably triggered if such a negative rating prevented a debt offering (or
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embarrassed public pension funds so that they declined to buy in G.M.’s debt offering).
Congress could threaten to withhold further appropriations to such an agency unless its
pessimism about the lowly-rated favored firm were corrected.
This U.S. example is probably mirrored by equivalent European examples (for
example, could a German “public” ratings agency easily downgrade Deutsche Bank or
Volkswagen?). Indeed, the European Commission’s interest in a European credit rating
agency may have been triggered in part by the political outrage at the Big Three for
downgrading Greece’s sovereign debt. Some non-European editorialists have already
recognized this episode as a classic case of “blaming the messenger.”53 The sad but
simple truth is that politically accountable public bodies may find it more difficult to
resist political pressure.
Nonetheless, even if a “Government Utility” rating agency is not a preferred
option, little harm would follow from the addition of such an agency to the mix of
opinions (if either the first or second option discussed above were selected). Also, a
regional credit rating agency that was not subject to the control of any one country might
be relatively less vulnerable to political pressure (although the example of the
downgrading Greece’s debt suggests otherwise).
The one advantage of a Government Utility Approach is also a disadvantage of
the “subscriber pays” model: those who do not pay are left in the dark by a “subscriber
pays” model. Although this criticism has been raised by those skeptical of a “subscriber
pays” model, the validity of this criticism probably depends on whether issuers and
arrangers would continue to hire Moody’s and S&P to deliver “issuer paid” ratings. If
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they would, then the public would still have at least one publicly disclosed rating (which
would likely be more accurate than today because of the competition from “private”
ratings). In effect, no one is worse off under this system. Moreover, the need for public
disclosure of ratings may depend on the extent of retail investor participation in the
market, and generally retail investors simply do not participate in the market for
structured finance products.
D. Reducing the Regulatory Power of Rating Agencies
Some believe that the basic error made by regulators was to grant ratings agencies
a de facto regulatory role. In truth, this decision, which dates back to the 1930s in the
U.S., was the product of the inability of financial regulators to define excessive risk
themselves. Needing to prevent mutual funds, banks, investment banks, and pension
funds and other collective investment vehicles from overinvesting in risky securities, U.S.
financial regulators either (1) required these institutions to limit their debt investments to
securities having an “investment grade” credit rating (or at least to keep the majority of
their portfolio in such securities) or (2) applied a stern “haircut” (or writedown) to
financial investments not having such a rating, thereby requiring investment and
commercial banks to retain greater capital for regulatory purposes. Then, realizing that
financial institutions could outflank these rules by turning to new “fly-by-night” credit
rating agencies, the SEC adopted rules in the mid-1970s that created a small, select club
of “Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Agencies” (or “NRSROs”). Because only
the ratings issued by these NRSRO agencies were to be considered by regulators in
determining the “investment grade” status of debt securities, this last step gave the Big
Three de facto regulatory power.

-40-

In hindsight, the now ironic premise behind the SEC’s reluctance to expand the
number of NRSROs was that the Big Three were beyond capture. Until 2006, the SEC
closely guarded its NRSRO designation and deliberately excluded most applicants
seeking it (and those granted admission to the NRSRO club were often acquired by
Moody’s or S&P). Eventually, the passage of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act in
2006 opened the doors of this club to new entrants. Although the economic barriers to
entry remain high, there are today at least ten NRSROs, up significantly from the three
firms that long dominated the field. But most of the new entrants occupy only specialized
“niche” markets, and few, if any, rate structured finance products (for reasons discussed
below).
Critics assert that the NRSRO designation (and similar requirements for
investment grade ratings adopted as early as the mid-1930s by the Comptroller of the
Currency) gave the credit rating agencies de facto licensing power and thereby compelled
investors to rely upon them for regulatory permission. Clearly, this outcome was not
intended, as federal regulators were simply following the path of least resistance. For
them, it would have been a regulatory nightmare to attempt to adopt comprehensive
standards of creditworthiness. But intent is less important than effect, and these critics
argue that regulatory licensing power became the principal barrier to entry that excluded
new entrants. This is a doubtful claim for several reasons: First, the Big Three also
dominate European ratings where they enjoy no similar licensing power. Second, because
Moody’s and S&P dominated the field since early in the 20th Century, well before the
creation of NRSROs and similar regulatory rules, the claim that their licensing power
explains their market dominance cannot explain their market power before the time that
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they received any licensing power. Third, experience since 2006 shows that expanding
the NRSRO club to ten firms has not eroded the dominance of the Big Three. Their
supremacy thus seems more based on “first mover” advantages and the difficulty of
entering the field without a proven track record. More likely, the initial firm to enter the
field gains reputational capital over time, which creates a barrier to entry, If (as widely
assumed) economies of scale characterize the production of financial information, the
first entrant can operate more efficiently and exclude later entrants.
In this light, the more plausible hypothesis for the Big Three’s dominance is that
sophisticated institutional investors relied on Moody’s and S&P because there was no one
better to rely upon, even though they knew the conflicts latent in the “issuer-pays”
model.54 Still another possibility is that some institutional investors were actually content
with rating inflation, as it allowed them to rationalize acquiring risky, but higher yield
securities.
Based on the foregoing diagnosis, some reformers in the U.S. (and the editorial
pages of the Wall Street Journal) have insisted on reducing the de facto regulatory power
accorded NRSRO rating agencies. An amendment to the pending federal financial reform
legislation, which was sponsored by Senator George LeMieux (R-Flo.), passed the U.S.
Senate on May 14, 2010, with all Republican Senators (and many Democrats) voting for
it. Incorporated into the final version of the Dodd-Frank Act, this provision deletes
references in several federal statutes governing financial regulators that require
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“investment grade” ratings from NRSRO rating agencies. Instead, it instructs these
regulators to adopt their own “standards of credit-worthiness.”
What will be the impact of this and similar provisions? Probably, they will have
no more than marginal impact on the market position of the “Big Three” credit rating
agencies – but for the fact that the current and pending federal financial statutes only seek
to regulate NRSRO rating agencies. Thus, a possible strategic move for the Big Three
may be to surrender their NRSRO status – and thereby avoid relatively demanding
legislation that only applies to NRSROs. Indeed, the combined impact of the Franken
Amendment and the LeMieux Amendment is to make the NRSRO status considerably
more of a burden than a benefit for the Big Three. Under the Franken Amendment, by
abandoning their NRSRO status, the Big Three would lose the ability to give the initial
ratings to most “structured finance” issuers, but logically they might prefer to focus on
marketing themselves to issuers as the providers of second opinions. Under the LeMieux
Amendment, the Big Three will lose some of their so-called licensing power.
Accordingly, when the burdens outweigh the benefits, it makes sense for them to
abandon NRSRO status – if they can.55
The idea that reducing the regulatory power of the ratings agencies is the key to
reform is popular in academia. The idea is simple, sweeping, and requires no
understanding of the institutional or regulatory context. In reality, however, reducing the
role of the rating agencies will likely be a slow and confused process. This has been
shown by the early experience under the Dodd-Frank Act. The Act overruled a long-
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standing SEC rule (Rule 436(g))56 that gave rating agencies an exemption from the
liability that a statutory expert faces under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.
Under Section 11, an “expert” whose opinion is cited in a registration statement used in
connection with a public offering of securities has presumptive liability for any material
misstatement that it makes. Thus, if the stock price declines after the offering, the expert
can be held liable for this price decline, unless it can prove that it was not negligent. The
burden of proof is on the expert. Although this provision was principally intended to
apply to auditors, the language of Section 11 clearly covers rating agencies as well, if the
registration statement references their ratings. For many years, the SEC had effectively
exempted rating agencies from Section 11 liability pursuant to Rule 436(g), which
allowed the rating agencies to avoid consenting to becoming a statutory “expert.”
Dissatisfied with the rating agencies performance, Congress ended this exemption in the
Dodd-Frank Act and expressly overrode Rule 436(g).
What happened? Predictably, the rating agencies refused to consent and thus
blocked their ratings from being referenced in registration statements (as they were
entitled to do). At this point, issuers discovered that, in the case of asset-backed
securitizations, the SEC’s rules required disclosure of the rating in the registration
statement; thus, they could not comply without the rating agency’s consent. As a result,
some offerings could not go forward.57
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For a brief time, the public debt markets froze, and offerings were delayed. In
response, the SEC declared a six month moratorium on its rule requiring the disclosure of
ratings in the registration statement in the hope that a compromise could be negotiated.58
The message here is that reform needs to be incremental, because ratings are too
deeply embedded in the debt offering process to be simply eliminated by the stroke of a
pen. Whether rating agencies will continue their “strike” if it would cost them issuer
business is uncertain, but negligence-based liability could conceivably cause them to
withdraw from some markets. Similar problems will arise if money market funds are told
that they may not rely on NRSRO “investment grade” ratings. Worried that they may
face personal liability for an investment that goes sour, the boards of such funds have
already fiercely resisted any deregulation that would deny them the ability to rely on
investment grade ratings, and politically they are a potent force. This does not mean that
deemphasis of credit ratings is wrong, but only that it will involve bruising political
fights.
E. Encouraging Due Diligence
As noted earlier, rating agencies are unique among financial gatekeepers in not
conducting factual verification. Obviously, factual verification would be costly, given the
sheer volume of ratings that they issue. Still, there is an alternative to the rating agency
doing its own factual verification: Rating agencies can instead require factual
investigation by independent experts of the critical facts on which their models rely. As
noted earlier, this had been the standard approach in rating structured finance products
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prior to 2000, as the investment banks and the rating agencies both relied on “due
diligence” firms (such as Clayton Holdings and the Bohan Group) that were paid by the
underwriters. However, as the housing bubble grew, investment banks cut off this flow of
information, possibly because it might alert rating agencies to problems.
The pending financial reform legislation in the U.S. takes several steps by which
to restore due diligence. NRSRO agencies are, for example, required by the Dodd-Frank
Act to disclose in a mandated form that must accompany the publication of each credit
rating a variety of factual information, including:
“(v) whether and to what extent third party due diligence services have
been used by the nationally recognized statistical rating organization, a
description of the information that such third party reviewed in conducting
due diligence services, and a description of the findings or conclusions of
such third party.”59
This provision does not mandate factual verification, but it creates an embarrassment cost
if due diligence services are not used. Also, under it, negative information discovered by
the third party due diligence firm may have to be disclosed. Still, some rating agencies
may find ways to rationalize their failure to use such a third party expert or to disclose
some lesser alternative that they did use.
A stronger incentive for the use of due diligence is created by the liability
provision of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 933 (“State of Mind in Private Actions”)
addresses the scienter requirements for pleading an anti-fraud action (based presumably
on Rule 10b-5) against a credit rating agency. It provides that in the case of an action
brought against a credit rating agency or a controlling person thereof:
“[I]t shall be sufficient for purposes of pleading any required state of mind
in relation to such action that the complaint state with particularity facts
59
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giving rise to a strong inference that the credit rating agency knowingly or
recklessly failed –
(1) to conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated security with
respect to the factual elements relied upon by its own methodology for
evaluating credit risk; or
(2) to obtain reasonable verification of such factual information of
such factual elements (which verification may be based on a sampling
technique that does not amount to an audit) from other sources that the
credit rating agency considered to be competent and that were independent
of the issuer and underwriter.”60
This language (which was drafted by this author) in effect says that the rating agency
must either conduct its own “reasonable investigation” or rely on an “independent” due
diligence firm. If the rating agency does not, then particularized factual pleadings of this
failure will enable the plaintiff to survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss. To be sure,
the plaintiff would still have to show loss causation, reliance, scienter, and the other
elements of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action,61 but a strong incentive arises to use a third
party due diligence firm in this setting.
In Europe, the litigation lever is both less favored and less available as a means by
which to influence the behavior of market actors. Still, European regulators could simply
mandate the use of a third party, “due diligence” firm to conduct factual verifications, at
least in the case of structured finance offerings. Both in Europe and the U.S., the use of a
third party due diligence firm is likely to be preferred by the rating agencies to any
requirement that it conduct its own due diligence, both because (1) the cost of the third
party firm’s services can be directly passed on to the underwriters or deal arrangers, and
(2) overlapping factual investigations by each rating agency are duplicative and
60
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inefficient. In a new and changed environment in which multiple rating agencies are
likely to rate the same security, use of a third party expert spares society the costly and
senseless duplication of requiring each rating agency to conduct a separate investigation
of the same facts. Any such report provided by a third party expert should presumably
fall within the earlier discussed “equal access” rule and so be accessible to all rating
agencies.
F. Increasing Competition
The creation of a Credit Agency Review Board (as the Franken Amendment
would mandate) may encourage some new entrants to become NRSRO rating agencies,
and, even more likely, it may encourage some “niche” firms that are already NRSROs to
extend the zone within which they rate securities. But this amendment does not seem
likely by itself to produce greater competition based on quality of services or price. To be
sure, if the Board used relative accuracy as its basis for choice, this might eventually
produce competition for greater accuracy, but only after an extended transitional period.
A reliable and measurable reputation for accuracy would probably take a decade or more
to develop, particularly for new entrants.
A quicker route to robust competition might be to require institutional investors to
obtain their own credit rating from an approved “subscriber pays” rating agency. This
would subsidize a new market, without requiring the government to choose the rater. Nor
could a “fly by night” rater that was ready to give inflated ratings to institutions desiring
such ratings easily enter this market if the institutional investor were required to choose
an NRSRO rating agency that met minimum governmental standards.
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Another sensible reform that seeks to encourage competition is the “equal access”
rule. It is a response to the complaints raised by the few “subscriber pays” rating agencies
that issuers will not give them access to the material facts about their deals. From the
issuer’s perspective, it does not need to hire every available credit rating agency, and
many issuers may regard the few existing “subscriber pays” rating agencies as
unwelcome nuisances because they arguably have an incentive to distinguish themselves
by giving lower ratings than the Big Three. As a result, issuers had generally declined to
release confidential data to them, and, particularly in the field of structured finance, this
chilled competition.
In response, the SEC has adopted Rule 17g-5, and Congress will similarly and
more generally mandate “equal access” in its pending legislation. The EU Commission’s
proposed rules take a similar approach. Issues, however, remain. The SEC’s rule requires
the retained rating agency to release all data to other NRSRO agencies that request it, but
does not require public disclosure. Under pending SEC rules, this data might be stored in
a confidential, password-protected website to which requesting NRSRO agencies would
be given access. Whatever the details, “equal access” seems a necessary precondition to
greater competition.
G. Staleness Reforms
Much criticism has pointed out that rating agencies are slow to update their
ratings or to downgrade them. One reason for this tendency is economic: there is today
little, if any, revenue in downgrading a client’s rating and some risk of a loss of future
business. One relevant response to this problem would be to require the issuer to enter
into a multi-year contract with the rating agency to monitor the issuer’s rating for a
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defined period after a rating’s issuance. This pattern is already beginning to develop, but
should be mandated. The issuer would be required to pay a “reasonable” annual fee for
this service. If the initial rater were picked by a neutral body (such as the Credit Rating
Agency Review Board), this reform seems promising. If not, a conflicted, “issuer-paid”
rating firm will probably still be slow to downgrade.
Were the issuer to default on these annual monitoring payments, regulations
might provide that the initial rating would have to be immediately withdrawn with a
prominent notation made on the rating agency’s web site (this would be substantially
equivalent to an auditor withdrawing its audit opinion, which is a well known “red flag”).
H. Internal Governance
An obvious (and politically irresistible) approach toward reform of the credit
rating agencies is to regulate their internal corporate governance. Section 932 of the
pending Senate Bill does this in a variety of ways. It would amend Section 15E of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require NRSRO rating agencies to:
(1) “establish, maintain, enforce and document an effective internal
control structure governing the implementation of and adherence to
policies, procedures, and methodologies for determining credit
ratings;”
(2) submit to the SEC an annual internal control report;
(3) separate the rating function from sales and marketing activities;
(4) appoint a compliance officer with specified duties; and
(5) provide additional disclosure with each rating, setting forth the details
of its methodology and the data relied upon.
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Many of these provisions seem to have been borrowed from the 2002 global settlement
reached by the SEC, the New York State Attorney General, the NASD and other agencies
with the securities industry regarding securities analysts. Debate continues over how
effective that settlement has been, and the SEC recently (and unsuccessfully) attempted
to drop as unnecessary some of the provisions in that settlement that precluded
communications between analysts and investment bankers. Although there is evidence
that senior executives at rating agencies placed pressure on their analysts, it is not clear
that the provisions of Section 932 will stop this.
In general, many of these corporate governance reforms were already in place at
investment banks, such as Bear Stearns, Lehman, and Merrill Lynch, and there is little
evidence that they worked to bring adverse information to the attention of those boards.
Compliance officers, for example, are required at all broker-dealer firms and will be
required by SEC rules at all NRSRO rating agencies.
From a policy perspective, it is difficult to place great hope on these reforms, but
they are low cost reforms that may sometimes provide valuable information to
experienced regulators.
I. Administrative Registration
Consensus exists in both the U.S. and Europe that credit rating agencies should be
registered with a government agency and subjected to its continuing oversight. To this
extent, reliance on self-regulation and voluntary codes of conduct has been abandoned in
Europe. In the U.S., pending legislation will create a new office within the SEC – the
“Office of Credit Ratings” – to oversee credit rating agencies; it also requires annual
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oversight of their internal controls and the consistency of their methodologies.62 Skeptics
have doubted the efficacy of such efforts, because governmental agencies have little
expertise in evaluating credit risk (and the SEC in particular has far less expertise in this
area than do bank regulators, such as the FDIC and the Federal Reserve). Some fear that
the tendency of bureaucratic regulators might be simply to focus on procedural regularity
by the rating agency: Did it keep full and complete records?; Did it have a compliance
officer; etc.?
Still, empirical research, such as that earlier noted by Griffin and Tang,63 has
identified a strange pattern of discretionary upward adjustments that inflated the size of
AAA-rated tranches in structured finance offerings. This is the type of pattern on which
regulatory oversight should properly focus. Indeed, the SEC has begun to respond. In
2009, SEC Rule 17g-2(a)(2) was amended to require NRSROs (in the case only of
structured finance products) to document the reasons for a deviation when a final credit
rating materially deviates from the rating implied by the NRSRO’s quantitative model.64
Europe needs to adopt a similar rule, because it should be a priority for regulators on both
sides of the Atlantic to monitor deviations by rating agencies from their quantitative
valuation models and demand detailed justifications.
Conclusion
The Good. Both in the U.S. and Europe, steps are being taken to reduce the
conflicts of interest in which credit rating agencies are virtually embedded. But these
steps are piecemeal and incomplete. Three simple truths need to be recognized:
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First, an “issuer pays” business model invites the sacrifice of reputational capital
in return for high current revenues.
Second, competition is good, except when it is bad. When CRAs compete for the
favor of issuers, rather than for that of investors, ratings arbitrage results. Both in their
indifference to “red flags” and their tolerance for “thin” subordination, the CRAs appear
to have engaged in a continuing race to the bottom.
Third, in a bubbly market, no one, including investors, may have a strong interest
in learning the truth. The process of ratings inflation continues until the short sellers
realize that enormous profits can be made from betting against inflated ratings. Only a
strong and highly motivated watchdog can offset this process of repression and selfdelusion.
From this perspective, neither the SEC nor the European Commission has yet
taken a significant step that is likely to spur the creation of a “subscriber pays” market for
credit information. At most, the SEC and the EU Commission have endorsed an “equal
access” rule that, if enforced, would preclude the most blatant form of issuer hostility to a
“subscriber pays” model. But useful as the SEC’s Rule 17g-5 is, it is insufficient to
jumpstart a “subscriber pays” market into existence. Instead, what is needed are
incentives. Appropriate incentives could be created in a variety of ways. Rules could
require investors or deal arrangers to obtain a second rating from a CRA selected by
investors. In the United States, the Franken Amendment (whose ultimate fate must await
a two year study by the SEC) does take an initial, but imperfect, step in this direction by
severing the connection between issuer payment and issuer selection of the CRA. But the
problem with the Franken Amendment is that it does nothing to encourage competition

-53-

among CRAs for the favor of investors (and thus to incentivize CRAs to conduct
independent research or verification). If, however, the initial rater were chosen through a
vote (or even a poll) of likely investors, then the nature of the competition would change,
and the CRAs would need to compete for the favor of investors.
The Bad. The major alternative to administrative oversight is deregulation, which
would be achieved by eliminating existing requirements for credit ratings. Although it
would be desirable to make investors less reliant on credit ratings, it is doubtful that this
can (or should) be achieved by a stroke of the statutory pen. Rapid deregulation will
likely produce a few failures at money market funds and other sensitive financial
institutions and the appearance of some “fly by night” rating agencies. Equally important,
it is necessary to recognize that credit rating agencies can play a socially useful and
economically efficient role as informational intermediaries.65 They can do so precisely
because specialization is efficient. Because structured finance products are complex and
opaque and because the rate of innovation in the field is rapid, “do-it-yourself” credit
analysis by even sophisticated institutional investors will be inefficient. Economies of
scale characterize the production of financial information, and thus even a large
institutional investor, if diversified, will not have the same broad range of expertise that a
properly motivated CRA should have.
Moreover, even if large institutional investors could assemble similar expertise inhouse, such an investment in an in-house capacity is essentially duplicative, as all these
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Empirical studies have documented the informational value of credit ratings and shown them to
be independent of and additive to the informational value that can be derived from credit default
swap prices. See Lars Norden & Martin Weber, The Comovement of Credit Default Swap, Bond
and Stock Markets: An Empirical Analysis, (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=635981
(2004)).
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institutions are essentially investing in the acquisition of similar information which they
could more cheaply purchase from specialized firms. For these reasons, any campaign to
abolish credit rating agencies or discourage their use would be misguided.
Nor is it realistic to attribute the dominance of the Big Three to their de facto
regulatory licensing power. Their market dominance preceded the SEC’s creation of
NRSROs, characterizes Europe as well in the absence of any similar regulatory power,
and has persisted in the U.S. even after the Credit Agency Reform Act of 2006, which
effectively ended any legal basis for their predominance. Their oligopolistic position
seems attributable instead to the high barriers to entry into this market, which require that
a new firm acquire reputational capital before it can acquire clients. This is the critical
“Catch 22” problem that impedes competition.
The Ugly. Worse yet, there is also a dark side to reform, as the creation of a
governmental rating agency presents special dangers. Not only might such an agency be
conflicted, but there is a more ominous danger that if private CRAs disagree with its
rating analysis, the regulator might take their disagreement as evidence of a deficiency in
the procedures or methodologies of the non-governmental CRAs. As anger against the
CRAs mounts, the prospect of retaliation for politically incorrect ratings lurks in the
background. Ironically, while the CRAs have been justly criticized in the U.S. for inflated
ratings, they may face even greater hostility in Europe for downgrades that are perceived
as excessive or premature.
The Prescription. How much regulation is needed? If the market incentivized
CRAs to compete for the favor of investors, less regulation and oversight would be
required. However, in the absence of such incentives, close regulatory oversight is
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needed. On what should such oversight focus? The empirical research has identified a
pattern of discretionary adjustments that CRAs made to inflate their ratings.
Unfortunately, the tendency of a bureaucratic regulator is more to focus on procedural
regularity, record-keeping, and adequate staffing. Such procedurally-oriented
bureaucratic oversight promises little benefit. Instead, upward adjustments and deviations
from the CRA’s normal valuation model should be the regulatory focus.
Precisely because the term “oversight” is vague and regulatory supervision can
sometimes degenerate into bureaucratic nitpicking (or worse), a clear regulatory agenda
needs to be specified for the new ESMA in its oversight of CRAs in Europe. As just
noted, the first priority should be to focus on upward deviations or adjustments from the
CRA’s methodology, which methodology must be publicly disclosed, at least in the case
of issuer-paid CRAs.66 Briefly, ESMA’s priorities should include:
(1) implementation of a detailed “equal access” rule;
(2) requiring multi-year fee contracts between the issuer and a rating agency hired
or paid by the issuer so that follow-up monitoring of the initial rating is
required;
(3) a corresponding requirement that when a CRA changes its methodology, it
must revise all existing ratings that would have been originally affected by
that change within a defined period;
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As just discussed, SEC Rule 17g-2(a)(2), adopted only in 2009, requires NRSROs to document
the reasons for a deviation from their quantitative valuation models. See text and note supra at
note 64. SEC Rule 17g-1 also requires public disclosure by the CRA of the methodology that it
uses to determine ratings, and such disclosure must be sufficiently detailed to provide users of the
ratings with a clear understanding of the process used by the NRSRO.
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(4) the development of a publicly available ratings history for each CRA,
enabling investors to see the subsequent history of its ratings, including all
defaults and downgrades;67
(5) prohibition of certain clear conflicts of interest, including rating offerings on
which the CRA consulted (i.e., “self-rating”);68
(6) a rule requiring the disclosure of any “preliminary” ratings to discourage
rating shopping; and
(7) encouraging the use of third party “due diligence” firms to assure factual
verification.
Much is changing. In this flux, the optimist will see a growing consensus that
closer regulation is both needed and gaining political support. The pessimist will sense
instead that regulators may increasingly ready to punish CRAs for politically sensitive
ratings downgrades (either of a locally favored company or a sovereign debt where the
effect is to destabilize the market or a currency). The practice of “blaming the
messenger” for bad news is a tradition that has persisted for millennia. Unacceptable as
the performance of the CRAs has been, the future could see them caught between Scylla
and Charybdis: sued by investors in the United States for inflated ratings and disciplined
by politically-motivated regulators in Europe for downgrades that destabilize markets or
disfavor politically powerful local companies.
67

SEC Rule 17g-2 already requires such rating histories to a limited extent. Under it, the CRA
must disclose 10% of the ratings, chosen at random, for each class of ratings in which the
NRSRO rating agency participated. Under a 2009 amendment to this rule, the 10% requirement
increases to 100% for ratings issued after June 26, 2007. See 17 C.F.R. Section 240.17g-2 (2009).
68
SEC Rule 17g-5 precludes an NRSRO issuer from issuing or maintaining a credit rating with
respect to an issuer or obligor where it (or any associated person) “made recommendations . . .
about the corporate or legal structure, assets, liabilities, or activities of the obligor or issuer of the
security.” See SEC Rule 17g-5(c)(5). See 17 C.F.R. Section 240.17g-5(c)(5) (2009).
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Amidst all this change, one priority must be insisted upon: the failure to address
the “issuer pays” business model, while addressing only more specific conflicts (such as
those addressed by the “equal access” rule), amounts to re-arranging the deck chairs on
the Titanic, while ignoring the gaping hole created by the iceberg. On both sides of the
Atlantic, there should be a recognition that (1) the existing market for ratings failed, (2)
voluntary self-regulation and reliance on the rating agency’s desire to protect its
“reputational capital” is inadequate, and (3) incentives must be aligned so that the
watchdog is motivated to watch carefully.
Although regulatory supervision can mitigate conflicts of interest, the intensity of
such supervision always eases once “boom” times arrive again, and thus the cycle leads
back to laxity. Because of the inevitability of this sine curve of regulatory intensity, the
sounder course is to encourage a “subscriber pays” model that can compete with the
“issuer pays” model. But because of the “public goods” nature of financial information, a
“subscriber pays” (or “platform pays”) model will not arrive naturally, and regulatory
interventions are necessary to prod it into existence. If we get the incentives right,
relatively little regulation is needed. But if the incentives remain poorly aligned, it is
unclear whether any level of regulation can ensure ratings accuracy.
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